Violent conflict and ‘situations of fragility’ represent significant challenges for aid effectiveness. Applying traditional development approaches in an unchanged fashion in such contexts simply does not work. Aid can have unintended interactions with conflict – both to exacerbate or mitigate violence or the potential for violence.¹ For this reason, CARE International believes that working in or on conflict requires a different approach.

The Accra Agenda for Action and follow-up towards the 2010 Beijing review offer opportunities for reform, but only if donors translate policy into action. Concrete and time-bound commitments will be essential. CARE International believes that aid reforms need to place a much greater emphasis on conflict sensitivity and human rights-centred approaches to aid. In recent years, donor debates on conflict and so-called ‘fragile states’ have become increasingly driven by the ‘War on Terror’.² This has manifested in a donor preoccupation with what is termed ‘whole-of-government approaches’ to coordination between development, defence and diplomacy. This trend has distracted from more locally-appropriate approaches to aid in conflict-affected countries. For this reason, we welcome current donor efforts to review policy and funding for early recovery, stabilisation, peacebuilding and state-building.³ The Kinshasa statement, agreed by donor and partner governments in July 2008, sets out a progressive agenda for these efforts beyond the Accra Aid Effectiveness summit.⁴

In this context, CARE International makes the following recommendations:

- **Improving donor accountability in conflict and fragile states**
  Donors should make clear commitments to donor accountability against the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative and the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. Best practice standards should be incorporated into multi-donor planning, assessments and evaluations. Such processes should take deliberate steps to ensure beneficiary accountability.

- **State-building: Recognising the role of citizenship and civil society**
  Donors and partner governments should recognise the important role of citizenship and civil society in state-building, and reflect this in the proposed objectives for peacebuilding and statebuilding. Civil society should be involved in international and country-level dialogue on the objectives.

- **More and better funding for early recovery**
  Donors should increase funding for early recovery; recognising the need for a mix of aid modalities in such contexts. Any new early recovery funding instruments should be designed to ensure transparency, accountability and direct civil society access.

- **Promoting ‘strategic peacebuilding’**
  Objectives for peacebuilding and state-building should be informed by a concept of ‘strategic peacebuilding’. This would entail that donor funding and NGO programmes are based on solid conflict analysis; seek synergies with other peacebuilding interventions; ensure a clearly articulated theory of change; and foster links between the micro (project) and macro (context) levels.

- **Compacts: Strengthening mutual accountability in post-conflict transition**
  Donors and post-conflict governments should negotiate ‘Compacts’ outlining their financial and political obligations in addressing the root causes of violence, promoting recovery and consolidating peace. Such Compacts should be reviewed through regular and transparent processes at country and international levels. Donors should give direct support towards empowering civil society to hold duty-bearers to account.
CARE International believes that the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) should result in clearer commitments on the accountability of donor performance in fragile states. The AAA makes a reference to the Fragile States Principles, which is to be welcomed. However, in situations of on-going conflict, these principles need to be balanced against humanitarian principles, as defined under the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. More is also needed to ensure that these standards translate into funding and programmes on the ground. For this reason, donors should incorporate the principles into their monitoring, evaluation and accountability processes. They should also use inter-agency planning, assessment and evaluation processes to hold each other accountable. Parliaments in donor nations should use the fragile states principles and Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative as frameworks against which to hold their national donor agencies to account. Such aid accountability initiatives should always seek input from their ultimate beneficiaries: people living in situations of conflict and fragility.

Fragile States Principles: Conflict sensitivity subordinated to security interests?

The ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States’ were developed to address the distinct challenges of aid effectiveness in so-called fragile states. The principles advocate a holistic approach to aid and political engagement in conflict-affected or fragile states. They underline the importance of political analysis to understand the context; and an intelligent mix of aid targeting and modalities in order to contribute to stability and peace where possible. The principles also recognise the importance of both building effective state institutions, and empowering civil society to promote government transparency and accountability. Implementation of the principles has been uneven, however, with aid policy in some fragile states increasingly driven by the ‘War on Terror’. As a consequence, donor security objectives have overly shaped the effort to promote a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ between development, defence and diplomacy. For example, proposals for the new US military command structure in Africa, entitled ‘AFRICOM’, expand the US military’s role into development programming. CARE’s experience raises serious concerns about the extent to which some donors have instrumentalised aid for a security-driven agenda. Evidence from Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa suggests that this can be both ineffective or even counter-productive in its own terms; and jeopardises the safety and security of aid agencies, projects and beneficiaries. This trend has led to an increased
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use of aid by military forces to deliver on ‘force protection’ or intelligence-gathering objectives. In such projects, neglect of good
development practice - including sustainability, transparency or accountability - has resulted in generating resentment and even
fuelling local-level conflict.

CARE International believes that donor efforts at Accra and beyond should herald a renewed commitment to conflict sensitivity,
and the accountability of aid in fragile states. Efforts by donors to strengthen coordination should not erode their commitment
to the neutrality, independence and impartiality of humanitarian assistance. In post-conflict situations, donors should
incorporate the principles into their bilateral and multilateral needs assessments, coordination efforts and funding modalities.
They should also feature in country-level evaluations of donor performance and peer reviews. The national government and civil
society should be given a key role at both country and international levels in such efforts. Donors should ensure that such efforts
are participatory and inclusive across political, economic, social and conflict divides. Such processes could make a practical
contribution to promoting accountability between donors, and between donors and partner governments.

Accountability against the Good Humanitarian Donorship commitments

The fragile states principles need to be balanced against other donor commitments relevant in crisis situations, in particular
humanitarian principles. Donors developed the ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship’ initiative (GHD) to promote a more effective and
principled approach to humanitarian assistance.9 Again, implementation of best practice standards remains a key challenge.

In crisis situations, government is frequently absent or contested. For this reason, the issue of direct accountability to the
beneficiary population itself comes to the fore in humanitarian response. While the UN humanitarian system has undergone
significant institutional reform in recent years, the impact in terms of improved humanitarian outcomes for beneficiaries remains
unclear. To address this weakness and become more accountable, the UN and donors should invest more in mechanisms and
processes that promote accountability to beneficiaries. Examples would include ensuring that beneficiary accountability features
as a key element of inter-agency real time evaluations so that the effectiveness of a response is constantly re-evaluated, and
programme adapted if necessary.10 Bilateral donors have also been inconsistent in translating the GHD principles into their
bilateral policy and funding. Donors should learn and build from initiatives, such as the EU Humanitarian Consensus, which have
provided frameworks for translating GHD into bilateral policy and funding.11
State-building: Recognising the role of citizenship and civil society

‘State building is about strengthening state-society relations and working with all three branches of government (executive, judiciary, legislative) and civil society. State building takes place at all levels of government - from local to national.’

Kinshasa Statement, July 2008

The concept of ‘state-building’ has risen up the agenda of post-conflict aid policy. For this reason, CARE International welcomes the Kinshasa Statement, agreed by donors and partner governments in July 2008, which recognises the critical role played by citizenship and civil society organisations in such efforts. The Accra Agenda for Action and subsequent efforts need to build on this holistic understanding of good governance in developing objectives for state-building. The process to develop such objectives, as well as on-going donor funding, also needs to recognise and help mitigate the risks and challenges for civil society programmes in contexts of post-conflict transition.

Peace processes require a political settlement, typically negotiated at the elite level, to be gradually extended outwards. For this reason, ‘state-building’ efforts need to extend beyond a narrow focus on building central state institutions to encompass support for fostering state-society relations that contribute towards building a sustainable peace. CARE International’s experience in countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola demonstrates the importance of donor support to the ‘demand side’ of good governance and accountability. Support to central government institutions, such as a trained and financed civil service, army and police force must be complemented by support for democratic checks and balances, including a healthy involvement of civil society in monitoring and accountability mechanisms. As national funding for civil society is unlikely in the post-conflict period and the political space may be constrained, donors should provide continued support for civil society capacity-building.

Civil society can also make important contributions to service delivery, and efforts to build government capacity in the post-conflict transition. During periods of war, it is often informal, traditional and social institutions at the community level which have sustained service delivery and maintained some measure of legitimacy. In the aftermath of war, central government capacity to implement basic services is often weak. In such contexts, NGOs can play an enabling role in supporting ‘state-building’ efforts to build on such grassroots capacities.
For this reason, donors need to maintain a mix of different aid modalities; investing in central government capacity-building while also maintaining and expanding delivery of basic services. This has proved a difficult balancing act. The Paris Declaration cannot be applied in an unchanged fashion in fragile states. A premature reliance on developmental approaches to aid, such as direct budgetary support, risks resulting in ‘service gaps’ emerging in regions or sectors that are beyond the government’s capacity to implement programmes, or its political reach. For example, donors regularly describe the ‘National Solidarity Programme’ (NSP) as the flagship initiative to promote state-building in Afghanistan. This programme relies to a significant extent on the capacity of NGOs to facilitate linkages between communities and the central government, and provide support for small-scale projects to consolidate that link. Yet despite huge investments in technical assistance and training for the Afghan government, the NSP has faced significant and damaging delays in project implementation due to the weak capacity of central ministries to administer and disburse NSP funding to the community level. Government-aligned programmes, such as NSP, in a context of on-going insurgency can also lead to NGO implementing partners being targeted for attack.

The problems arising from using developmental approaches in a conflict setting can also be illustrated by Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF). Challenges have included protracted UN-World Bank and donor-government negotiations on their management, weak administrative capacity at national level and delays in disbursements of funding to frontline programmes. Procedures used by the World Bank with MDTFs have proven inappropriate in working with post-conflict governments. For example, the MDTF in Sudan took two years to disburse funding following its creation after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. In early 2006, donors had cut drug supply from NGO humanitarian funding as the MDTF was intended to provide these through the Government of South Sudan. However, although the MDTF passed an ‘emergency’ funding grant in 2006, the drugs were still unavailable by March in primary health centres or to NGOs trying to assist the Ministry of Health to provide services.

In this context, CARE welcomes the holistic concept of good governance described in the Kinshasha Statement, drafted by donors and partner governments in preparation for the Accra event. That Kinshasha Statement makes reference to the critical importance of state-society relations for good governance, and recognises the role for civil society in monitoring and policy dialogue. The Accra Agenda for Action calls on donors and partner governments to agree objectives for peacebuilding and state-building. In the spirit of the Kinshasha Statement, CARE International believes that such an initiative would be greatly enhanced through the effective participation and input of civil society.

**State-building from below: NGO programmes to promote citizenship in Angola**

Angola’s political, social and economic challenges cannot be understood without recognising the legacy of three decades of civil war. A history of authoritarian, undemocratic and heavily centralised government resulted in a society torn by exclusion, neglect of human rights, and institutions with little capacities to perform key functions to realise the rights and needs of citizens.

The current economic growth (27% p.a.) is centred around the oil industry, allowing for potentially huge investments in social infrastructure and development. Efforts to make this wealth translate into poverty reduction and sustainable development have focused on bringing governance closer to the population, and enhancing citizens’ voices in decision-making. As a consequence, the Government of Angola has started to reform governance structures and NGOs have played a key role in these efforts.

It is in this context that CARE Angola developed the ‘Participatory Integrated Development Planning’ programme for municipal administrations (PIDP). The PIDP seeks to facilitate inclusive, equitable and sustainable development planning; thereby promoting what might be termed a rights-based approach to state-building. The PIDP has supported the creation of municipal forums by means of which municipal authorities prepare, in consultation with communities, CSOs and stakeholders, a long-term vision, goals and objectives, medium-term sectoral programmes and annual operation plans. These plans are then submitted to the provincial government for endorsement and subsequently to the Ministry of Finance for incorporation in the national investment programme and municipal development fund. The key principles underlying PIDP are: (1) multi-stakeholder consensus; (2) inclusiveness and equity; (3) cost-effectiveness in fulfilling the most important needs of local communities.

The PIDP process has been implemented in a number of municipalities, including Andulo, one of the most conflict-affected areas in the central highlands of Angola. The region encompasses two-thirds of the country’s rural population, with 48% of households categorised as Very Vulnerable in the 2005 FAO/WFP Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis. The Andulo PIDP is the first comprehensive development and investment plan in Angola that cascades up local communities’ needs-based plans to feed into higher level sectoral development plans. The Andulo plan focuses on the livestock and agriculture potential in the region, and also aims to increase the economic and food security of women and to provide universal access to basic services for children. The success of this initiative has led to the decision of central government to devolve budgetary responsibilities to this unit of government, using the oil windfalls, allocating six million US dollars to 68 municipalities and implementing the PIDP approach in these municipalities.
The transition from humanitarian relief to recovery and longer-term development has long been characterised by gaps in funding, strategy and capacity. For this reason, CARE International welcomes efforts to review the aid system’s financing of early recovery. New and innovative ways to fund early recovery are required to ensure that countries do not fall back into conflict, and that the rights and needs of local populations are more effectively addressed as soon as possible in the transition from war to peace.

NGOs are key actors in early recovery. During a period of conflict, in which governance is contested, the capacity for central institutions to deliver services in an effective or accountable fashion is typically eroded. Significant amounts of donor funding will have been channelled through humanitarian programmes. Such programmes are often by their very nature independent of government structures and strategies, as political alignment during a war may lead to targeting by belligerents in the conflict. While the long-term goal for recovery is to build government capacity to deliver services, NGOs can make significant contributions in terms of both government capacity-building and service delivery in the interim. For this reason, any proposals to develop new funding modalities for early recovery should involve in-depth consultation with NGOs with extensive practical experience in working across relief, recovery and development programming. The proposed ad-hoc working-group to follow-up on financing issues after Accra should therefore include active participation of civil society.

The proposal for ‘flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities’ is welcome. For example, only 14% of the $98 million UN Transitional Appeal for Haiti (2006-2007), was funded. However, given recent experience with UN humanitarian funding, CARE maintains serious concerns about proposals for ‘pooled funding’ mechanisms situated under UN administration. In creating any such funding instruments, donors should apply lessons from roll-out of the United Nations (UN) Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the in-country UN Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF). These funds have experienced significant and protracted challenges; especially in terms of funding reaching operational agencies at field level in a timely fashion. The importance of efficiency, transparency, accountability and civil society access should be recognized and addressed up-front in any new early recovery fund. If the fund is to be located and administered within UNDP or the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, then administration of their funds need to be reformed to ensure effective, transparent and accountable management. UN bureaucratic restrictions also need to be reformed to enable direct NGO access for funding.
Lessons learned from UN Central Emergency Response Fund

The draft evaluation of the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) highlights a number of challenges of relevance to any new UN pooled funds for early recovery. While the evaluation is largely positive in terms of the CERF’s funding for UN agencies, it is decidedly more negative regarding the CERF’s relevance for NGOs: “In contrast, the CERF has not yet led to an improvement in the relations between the UN agencies and the community of NGOs, except in a small number of cases, where exceptional partnership arrangements have been put in place, and in situations where CERF has provided funding to NGOs through ERFs.” It goes on to remind readers that “NGOs have unique strengths to contribute to the objectives of the CERF, and hence need to play a more central role in CERF processes than they have been playing so far.” Another significant challenge lies in the fund’s weak systems and transparency in terms of tracking and accounting for expenditure. Specific recommendations made in the draft report include:

- Explore various options for setting up mechanisms which NGOs can access rapidly and directly, and at low cost, for example in-country rapid response mechanisms, or ERFs, part-funded by CERF, in countries in protracted crises or subject to disasters, as a way of funding reputable and principled civil society organisations with recognised programme capacity.

- Encourage UN agencies to ‘pre-qualify’ appropriate NGO partners, at global and national levels.
Promoting ‘Strategic Peacebuilding’

**CARE International concept of ‘Strategic Peacebuilding’**

Strategic peacebuilding:

- Is based on solid conflict analysis
- Has a clear vision of the peace it seeks to construct
- Seeks synergies with other peacebuilding interventions
- Has a clearly articulated theory of change
- Articulates the link between micro (project) and macro (context/conflict), and seek impacts at the macro level

Discussions towards Accra have led to proposals for: ‘a set of realistic peace- and state-building objectives that address the root causes of conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and participation of women.’ These objectives are to be informed by an ‘international dialogue’ between partners and donors. CARE International believes that this initiative should be informed by the concept of ‘strategic peacebuilding’.

As illustrated by the boxed case study on Kosovo, our research suggests that donor funding for peacebuilding is too often fragmented, ill-targeted and too short-term. An ‘international dialogue’ on peacebuilding and state-building objectives should support efforts to promote best practice in peacebuilding; capturing the lessons learned from previous and existing programmes. Support for more effective approaches to peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation can then inform future programme design and implementation.

Donors often lament that, in post-conflict contexts, everything seems a priority and so nothing is prioritised. In the transition from war to peace, policy-makers often lack information and consensus over which issues, sectors or needs are most critical. Funding prioritisation is certainly a critical issue in setting objectives for peacebuilding and state-building. However, debates on funding should not overshadow attention to programme quality, or the more political challenges associated with tackling ‘the root causes of conflict and fragility’.

In many conflict-affected countries, the root causes of violence are complex, including both internal factors, such as exclusionary governance, and regional or even international dimensions. Both the international dialogue and country-level processes to identify objectives should give priority to these political dimensions of peacebuilding, and identifying ways to address them. In line with the ‘strategic peacebuilding’ concept, individual agencies involved in such dialogue would then be challenged to explore how their peacebuilding interventions are informed by the wider conflict analysis and efforts to consolidate peace.

The strategic peacebuilding concept also emphasises the importance of connecting grassroots peacebuilding efforts (micro) with political efforts to negotiate and consolidate peace (macro). Civil society can play an important role in this. For example, the Darfur Peace Agreement was in part failed because not all rebel movements participated in the agreement. However a lack of community support was also important, with key underlying issues related to return of displaced peoples and compensation for damages and loss of life seen as being left unresolved. Where conflicts have become highly fragmented and diffuse, such as in Darfur or Somalia, involving communities, their leaders and local civil society organisations may be critical to achieving success at any scale. In Darfur for example, CARE has had promising experiences with village level peace committees bringing together nomads and sedentary agro-pastoralists from different tribes to settle long lasting conflicts peacefully. Creating the space and resources for such initiatives and linking them with national or regional peace efforts should be an important part of the dialogue on peacebuilding objectives.
Strategic Peacebuilding? Lessons learned from Kosovo

The violence of March 2004 in Kosovo prompted many agencies to reflect on their peacebuilding programmes. CARE worked with CDA on an innovative study to evaluate peacebuilding efforts of many agencies in the country: What factors enabled communities to resist or not to participate in the violence? To what extent and how did peacebuilding contribute to these factors? Our research suggested that peacebuilding had some important, if modest, effects on inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo, especially on the people who have directly participated. However, the evidence points to several ways in which peacebuilding programmes missed the mark and could be more effective:

**Failure to transform individual ties into networks of civic engagement.** The negligible role of inter-ethnic “bridging” social capital in preventing inter-ethnic violence (IEV) is due, in part, to the failure of efforts to build (or rebuild) cross-ethnic ties and cooperation to transform individual ties into networks of civic engagement that connect people across ethnic lines, built trust and facilitate communication and cooperation on issues of public concern. Peacebuilding programming fell short of its potential in three areas:

- Programmes often did not move beyond the entry point for inter-ethnic contact, in terms of deepening or expanding initial experiences of inter-ethnic interaction. Funding for “soft” programming was limited, and often withdrawn or redirected once initial successes were achieved, limiting the depth and scope of inter-ethnic engagement.
- Peacebuilding through economic cooperation tended also to mirror existing, implicit “rules of the game” for inter-ethnic interaction amongst Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs, which permitted interaction for economic, but not social or political purposes.
- Finally, peacebuilding programmes often worked around issues of intra-community resistance to inter-ethnic contact and rapprochement – providing space, protection, logistics and a cover for people to meet. They did not, however, work on intra-community IEV perpetrated because of pressure not to engage with people across ethnic lines.

**Programmes did not address key driving factors of conflict.** Although the violence in March 2004 was attributed by many to the poor state of the economy, community members consistently mentioned missing persons and war crimes (K-Albanians) and security, justice and failure to prosecute perpetrators of IEV when asked about obstacles to peace. Horizontal inequalities between Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs also seem to have played a role. Yet few (if any) programmes addressed these key issues even indirectly.

**The focus on multi-ethnicity and returns as the core of peacebuilding increased divisions rather than improving relations.** Resentment developed amongst Kosovo-Albanians as they perceived that resources and attention had been dedicated to Kosovo-Serbs at their expense. The practice of providing balancing grants did not significantly alleviate this feeling. The emphasis on multi-ethnicity was perceived in communities not as a “carrot” or reward for cooperation, but as a “conditionality” that was widely resented. Communities developed ways to circumvent the spirit of multi-ethnicity, either through pro forma multi-ethnicity in projects or by imposing conditions for agreeing to multi-ethnic cooperation. Programming exacerbated these unintended consequences by rewarding form and not following up on or monitoring substance.

**Programmes did not engage many key people and areas.** A significant proportion of programmes identified in this study focused on women, youth and returnees and their receiving communities. Women and youth are often considered natural bridge-builders or focused on the future. Yet youth and women’s programming did not support their potential to become key positive forces for peacebuilding in a hostile and polarised environment. There was also little focus on the “hard to reach” – less moderate people and people and groups that are “key” to success in the peace process. Participant selection processes requiring that applicants exhibit tolerance and reinforced the tendency to engage the easiest to reach.

**Geographic targeting:** Areas that were most affected by the war and largely mono-ethnic (e.g. Drenica) were reported to be more extreme politically, especially with regard to the status of Kosovo. Residents from these areas were reported to have travelled to participate, and in some cases lead, the violence in March 2004. Yet these areas did not receive the same levels of assistance as more mixed areas. Nor were they included significantly in inter-ethnic peacebuilding efforts.
Compacts: Strengthening mutual accountability in post-conflict transition

The Accra Agenda for Action outlines a number of proposals on strengthening mutual accountability between donors and partner governments. CARE International believes that mutual accountability is important, but it must be based on wider efforts to promote accountability and rights-based approaches for local populations. For mutual accountability to be effective, it must be grounded firmly in policies, institutions, and processes that support demand side of accountability and that ensure the participation and voice of ordinary people in decisions which affect their lives.

Mutual accountability is especially important, and yet even more challenging in situations of fragility and conflict. Funding and political attention from donors often evaporates at just the most critical moment in consolidating peace. Furthermore, so-called ‘fragile states’ also present obvious challenges in terms of their own capacity and, in some instances, willingness to act in an accountable fashion to either the local population or donors.

Recent years have witnessed the international community and new post-conflict governments negotiating peacebuilding strategic agreements, or ‘Compacts’, that outline commitments and pledges on both sides. One example of this would be the ‘Compact’ developed with the Government of Afghanistan. Other examples would be the ‘Strategic Agreements’ negotiated between the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and the governments of Burundi and Sierra Leone.

Such frameworks are potentially useful in articulating political and funding priorities for peace consolidation; providing a framework of benchmarks against which both donors and government can be held to account. Unsurprisingly, the main challenge has resided in ensuring effective follow-up in terms of monitoring and accountability. Concrete, measurable and time-bound indicators are critical for sequencing priorities and assessing progress and set-backs towards agreed commitments.

Critical to the legitimacy of such Compacts is their ownership amongst diverse national and international stakeholders, which thus entails meaningful consultations, including outside the national capital. Experience with the Peacebuilding Commission strategic frameworks suggests that the UN and donors need to provide additional and direct support to empower civil society to advocate for a genuinely inclusive and participatory process. Women often play a critical role in recovery and peace-building efforts at the grassroots level, which can be harnessed in these processes. For example, one bilateral donor provided financing in Burundi for an international peace-building NGO to support Dushirehamwe, a national network of women’s peace-building organisations. This network successfully advocated with other local and international NGOs for a more transparent and inclusive process to develop the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi.

Ways forward should include strengthened capacity to analyse progress and coordinate follow-up action, such as through the UN Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office; the establishment of regular and public reporting procedures at country and international levels; and support for the involvement of civil society as a ‘watch-dog’ to hold duty-bearers to account.
This paper outlines CARE International’s recommendations on the Accra Agenda for Action and follow-up towards the 2010 Beijing review.

The paper focuses on the following issues:

• Improving donor accountability in conflict and fragile states
• State-building: Recognising the role of citizenship and civil society
• More and better funding for early recovery
• Promoting ‘strategic peacebuilding’
• Compacts: Strengthening mutual accountability in post-conflict transition

CARE International is a non-governmental organisation working with over 45 million people in 70 of the world’s poorest countries.

2 See The Reality of Aid 2006 report: Focus on Conflict, Security and Development Co-operation
4 Kinshasa Statement, July 2008
5 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States available to download from: http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_35233262_1_1_1_1,00.html
7 Keene, Brooks (2008) Securitization of US Foreign Assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Preliminary Research CARE International USA
8 Aid and Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan (forthcoming 2008) Policy research paper by the British and Irish Agencies in Afghanistan Group (BAAG) and the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA)
9 See: http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/
10 See the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership initiative website: http://www.hapinternational.org/
11 Download the EU Humanitarian Consensus from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/consensus_en.htm
13 For example, during the initial period of the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s engagement in Sierra Leone (Spring 2007) some government representatives sought to focus the peacebuilding debate on funding gaps for programmes which donors had declined to finance through other channels. In contrast, other national stakeholders, including many government representatives, recognised that greater attention was required to address essentially political challenges associated with corruption and democratic accountability. Many informants in research conducted by CARE pointed to the then government’s failure to implement the most recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which were perceived as having widespread legitimacy in the country.
16 See section 23 of the penultimate draft Accra Agenda for Action